-
- SK hynix Surpasses Samsung in 40 Years, Wins on Earnings and Next-Gen Memory Tech like HBM4 and SOCAMM
- SK hynix is now considered to have surpassed Samsung Electronics not only in terms of profitability but also in technology, 40 years after it began its memory semiconductor business.
Leveraging its advanced high-bandwidth memory (HBM) technology, SK hynix last year for the first time surpassed Samsung Electronics in annual operating profit. In the first quarter of this year as well, SK hynix posted KRW 4 trillion (US$ 2.88 billion) more in operating profit than Samsung.
Moreover, in next-generation memory technology—including advanced DRAM processes such as 1c and 1d, sixth-generation HBM4, the low-power memory module ‘SOCAMM’ being developed by NVIDIA, and the industry-leading 4D NAND flash—SK hynix is ahead of Samsung.
On April 24, SK hynix announced that in the first quarter of this year, it recorded sales of KRW 17.6392 trillion (US$ 12.72 billion), operating profit of KRW 7.4405 trillion (US$ 5.36 billion), and net income of KRW 8.1082 trillion (US$ 5.85 billion).
Compared to the same period last year, sales increased by 42% and operating profit by 158%. This marks the second-highest quarterly sales and operating profit in the company’s history. Notably, the operating margin has improved for eight consecutive quarters, reaching 42% in Q1.
According to securities firms, Samsung Electronics’ memory semiconductor operating profit for Q1 is estimated at KRW 3.3 trillion (US$ 2.38 billion). The gap in operating profit between SK hynix and Samsung exceeds KRW 4 trillion (US$ 2.88 billion).
In Samsung’s semiconductor (DS) division, the foundry and system LSI business units are estimated to have posted a combined loss of around KRW 2.5 trillion (US$ 1.8 billion) in Q1, with total quarterly operating profit at about KRW 800 billion (US$ 576 million).
In 2023, SK hynix achieved annual operating profit of KRW 23.5 trillion (US$ 16.95 billion), surpassing Samsung Electronics in annual semiconductor operating profit for the first time in its history. Samsung Electronics recorded operating profit of about KRW 20.54 trillion (US$ 14.82 billion) in its memory division and KRW 15 trillion (US$ 10.82 billion) across the entire semiconductor division.
This marks a milestone 40 years after SK hynix, originally Hyundai Electronics, began its semiconductor business with a successful test production of 16Kb SRAM on December 16, 1984, overtaking Samsung in performance.
The reversal of fortunes over four decades was driven by SK hynix’s HBM technology. Samsung had discontinued HBM development, judging it to lack market potential, but SK hynix continued to develop it steadily.
Since the explosive growth of the AI market in 2023, high-speed, high-capacity memory semiconductors have become essential for AI training and inference. HBM, ideally suited for this purpose, has emerged as a core memory in AI chips (GPUs).
SK hynix became a key supplier of HBM to NVIDIA in 2023 and benefited from the AI boom. In contrast, Samsung Electronics repeatedly failed to obtain NVIDIA’s HBM certification and missed out on full-scale benefits.
The gap between SK hynix and Samsung Electronics is expected to persist, as SK hynix is accelerating development of next-generation memory semiconductor technologies.
In particular, SK hynix is leading in DRAM process technology—the foundation of memory semiconductors.
Advanced DRAM processes have progressed from 1x (1st gen), 1y (2nd gen), 1z (3rd gen), 1a (4th gen), 1b (5th gen), to 1c (6th gen), with each generation reducing line width to enhance performance and power efficiency.
While Samsung reportedly stabilized its 5th-generation 1b process only this year, SK hynix succeeded in mass-producing DDR5 using the 1c process—the world’s first—in August last year. As of this month, the company’s 6th-generation 1c process yield reportedly reached 80%.
SK hynix has also moved early into the 7th-generation 1d process, forming a development team in January this year. Samsung is said to have just formed its own 1d process team this month, with some analysts saying it has yet to stabilize the 1c process.
The same trend applies to HBM, which is made by stacking DDR5 produced using advanced DRAM processes. SK hynix is preparing to supply 6th-generation HBM4 with 12-high stacks to NVIDIA. The company plans to complete mass production readiness in the second half of this year and begin production next year.
Samsung Electronics has not yet secured NVIDIA certification for its 5th-generation HBM3E with 12-high stacks. So far, it has only been supplying HBM3 and HBM3E with 8-high stacks.
In the development of ‘SOCAMM,’ a next-generation low-power memory module for AI servers being led by NVIDIA, SK hynix is also ahead of Samsung.
In March, at the “GTC 2025” event in San Jose, California, SK hynix and U.S.-based Micron showcased the actual SOCAMM module. Samsung has yet to reveal a physical product.
SOCAMM is expected to be installed in NVIDIA’s upcoming AI chip “Blackwell Ultra (GB300),” set for production in the second half of this year. Known for its low power consumption, SOCAMM is likely to be used in future autonomous vehicles, AI supercomputers, and robots. Gaining an early lead in the SOCAMM market is expected to greatly impact future competitiveness in memory semiconductors.
Beyond DRAM, SK hynix also holds a technological edge in NAND flash.
In November last year, SK hynix became the first in the world to successfully mass-produce 321-layer 1-terabit (Tb) 4D NAND, surpassing the 300-layer threshold. Samsung has set a target to begin production of 400-layer NAND this year, but its current products are estimated to be in the 280 to 290-layer range.
#SKhynix #SamsungElectronics #HBM #DRAM #SOCAMM #NANDflash #AIsemiconductor #memorychip #semiconductortechnology #techleadership
-
- Heo Young-in Acquitted of Breach of Trust, But Key Trial Still Ahead—SPC Struggles with ‘Anti-Labor’ Image
- Heo Young-in, Chairman of SPC Group, has been acquitted in one criminal case and still faces another—this is the story of the judicial risks surrounding him.
The Supreme Court recently upheld the not guilty verdict in a case where Chairman Heo was accused of evading gift tax by selling shares of an affiliate at a low price.
Heo was on trial for allegedly instructing the sale of Milldawon shares—owned by SPC affiliates Paris Croissant and Shany—to SPC Samlip at an unfairly low price.
Prosecutors claimed this act was aimed at evading the so-called “gift tax on unfair business practices.” However, both the first and second trials, as well as the Supreme Court, concluded that it was difficult to recognize intent for breach of trust.
Many view this not guilty verdict as a turning point that allows SPC Group to move past its legal risks and focus on global expansion.
However, others point out that “the real trial isn’t over yet.” That’s because Chairman Heo still faces trial over allegations of attempting to undermine labor unions.
Heo is accused of pressuring around 570 union members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) affiliated with the Paris Baguette branch to withdraw from the union between February 2021 and July 2022, and of giving low performance review scores to union members in May 2021, resulting in their promotion being denied.
◆ The Persistent ‘Anti-Labor’ Image of SPC
SPC Group faced intense public backlash after a fatal accident occurred at its Pyeongtaek SPL bakery plant in 2022.
The outrage escalated after it was revealed that the company continued production immediately following the incident, prompting widespread consumer anger and a boycott campaign. On social media, the hashtag “blood-stained bread” spread rapidly.
The issue isn’t just that the image was temporarily damaged—it has continued to build over time. Even before and after the fatal accident, SPC Group was repeatedly involved in controversies over worker deaths from overwork, allegations of industrial accident cover-ups, and union suppression. Chairman Heo’s union-busting trial is seen as part of this broader pattern.
At a press conference held on October 21, 2022, shortly after the fatal bakery accident, Heo promised to “thoroughly re-inspect the group’s overall safety management system and significantly strengthen safety management to prevent recurrence.” However, less than a year later, in August 2023, another fatal incident occurred when a worker at the Shany bakery plant died after being caught in a dough mixer.
According to a report released in May 2024 by the Citizens’ Coalition for Consumer Sovereignty, a total of 502 victims of industrial accidents were recorded at SPC Group affiliates between 2017 and September 2022.
◆ The Lost Corporate Image of SPC Group—The Social ‘Trial’ Is Not Over
As a food company, SPC Group’s brand image has a critical influence on consumer decisions. Beyond basic requirements for trust, safety, and hygiene in food, corporate ethics have also become a core part of brand competitiveness.
A similar example is Namyang Dairy, which has long suffered from consumer boycotts—not due to hygiene or safety issues, but because of ethical controversies involving the owner family.
Some argue that the SPC boycott was a short-lived episode. However, SPC Samlip’s business performance has shown clear stagnation since the boycott began in 2022.
In 2024, SPC Samlip recorded consolidated revenue of KRW 3.4279 trillion (US$ 2.47 billion), a decrease of 0.15% compared to 2023. Compared to 2022—when it was hit hardest by the boycott—revenue grew only 3.42% over two years.
Its operating profit margin has remained flat at around 2.7% from 2022 through 2024.
◆ Heo Young-in’s Real Challenge: Rebuilding Social Trust, Not Just Legal Acquittals
Some argue that the real issue for SPC Group and Chairman Heo Young-in is not legal risk, but the risk of losing public trust.
SPC Group is a B2C company in direct contact with consumers, and the public and civil society often value social responsibility and ethical leadership more than legal innocence.
In fact, civic groups, consumers, and labor organizations continue to demand structural reforms and a sincere apology from SPC.
Even when “KBO Bread,” a new product released by SPC Samlip in late March, gained explosive popularity, posts continued to appear on social media urging boycotts due to its affiliation with SPC Group.
An industry insider commented, “We can’t say for certain that SPC Samlip’s stagnant sales are solely due to the boycott,” but added, “It’s hard to deny that SPC Group’s image has severely deteriorated among consumers.”
#HeoYoungin #SPCGroup #SPCSamlip #judicialrisk #boycottSPC #unionbusting #industrialaccidents #Koreanfoodindustry #brandreputation #socialresponsibility
-
- Storm Clouds Over Shinsegae Fashion — William Kim’s High Salary Draws Scrutiny Amid Weak Performance
- Shinsegae International is expected to post Q1 earnings next month that fall short of already-lowered market expectations. Analysts point to underperformance in its fashion division — which accounts for over half of total revenue — as the main drag on company-wide growth.
CEO William Kim, who previously oversaw all of Shinsegae International, was reassigned solely to the fashion division in a year-end executive reshuffle amid weak performance. Given his status as the highest-paid executive in the group, pressure is mounting for him to justify his compensation with tangible results.
Observers are watching closely to see whether Kim can find a breakthrough in the struggling fashion business, which is facing both domestic consumption slowdown and adverse exchange rates.
According to financial data firm FnGuide on April 23, Shinsegae International’s Q1 2024 consensus operating profit is estimated at ₩9.6 billion (approx. $7.38 million), down 14.4% year-on-year. This continues a downward trend, following a 45% year-on-year decline in full-year operating profit to ₩26.8 billion (approx. $20.62 million) in 2023. The current estimate is also down 35% from the ₩13 billion (approx. $10 million) forecast from three months ago.
Brokerages Kiwoom Securities and NH Investment & Securities are even more bearish, estimating Q1 operating profits at ₩5.2 billion (approx. $4 million) and ₩6.1 billion (approx. $4.7 million), respectively — well below market consensus. Both have revised down their target prices by 14.3% (to ₩12,000 ≈ $9.23) and 19.2% (to ₩10,500 ≈ $8.08). NH also downgraded its investment rating from “Buy” to “Neutral.”
The gloom surrounding Shinsegae International stems from a double whammy: a domestic fashion market frozen by weak consumption and a strong U.S. dollar, which impacts its high-end import-focused business model.
Founded in 1996, the company began by importing foreign luxury fashion brands to the Korean market. Today, it still derives most of its revenue from domestic sales and holds numerous high-priced imported brands. As a result, it’s more vulnerable than peers to local economic downturns and currency volatility.
Jung Ji-yoon, an analyst at NH Investment & Securities, noted, “With a portfolio centered on expensive imported brands, sales recovery has been slower than expected. The prolonged strength of the dollar is also increasing procurement costs. Meanwhile, direct entries of global megabrands into Korea are reducing Shinsegae’s earnings visibility.”
Shinsegae International currently operates in three major segments: fashion, cosmetics, and lifestyle products. In 2023, fashion accounted for 50.7% of total sales, followed by cosmetics at 31.7% and lifestyle at 17.7%.
William Kim was appointed sole CEO in January 2023. However, in October that year, Hong-geuk Kim, CEO of Shinsegae Casa, took over the beauty and lifestyle divisions, leaving Kim solely in charge of fashion.
Born in 1972, William Kim holds a degree in accounting from the University of Colorado. He previously served as CFO at Gucci and Senior VP of Retail and Digital at Burberry, making him a seasoned veteran of global luxury brands.
The executive shuffle was widely interpreted as a response to lackluster performance under Kim’s leadership. With Shinsegae International struggling amid fashion sector woes, the group sought to strengthen business expertise and expedite decision-making.
Despite weak overall earnings, the cosmetics division is expected to have maintained solid growth in Q1. Jo So-jung, an analyst at Kiwoom Securities, said, “Cosmetics revenue likely rose 17% year-on-year. While some imported brands saw distribution downsizing, that was offset by contributions from Amuse and growth in Shinsegae’s own brands.”
Amuse, a vegan cosmetics brand targeting younger consumers with strong global recognition, was fully acquired by Shinsegae International in 2023 for ₩71.3 billion (approx. $54.85 million) under Kim’s leadership.
William Kim is the highest-paid executive in Shinsegae Group. In 2023, he received ₩4.15 billion (approx. $3.19 million) in total compensation from both Shinsegae International and Shinsegae’s Digital & Global division — surpassing Chairwoman Chung Yoo-kyung’s ₩3.6 billion (approx. $2.77 million) pay from Shinsegae.
This underscores the high level of expectations placed on Kim by the group.
However, Shinsegae International’s performance has sharply declined under his leadership. After achieving a record ₩115.3 billion (approx. $88.7 million) in operating profit in 2022, the company saw a 57.7% drop to ₩48.7 billion (approx. $37.5 million) in 2023, and the downtrend continues.
Some argue that the poor results reflect broader market challenges and the difficulty of overseeing both fashion and beauty simultaneously, making it hard for Kim to fully demonstrate his capabilities.
But this year, things are different. Kim is now solely responsible for fashion — his specialty — and failure to produce a turnaround may mean no further opportunities. His term runs until March 2026.
Most analysts agree that a swift rebound is unlikely. Jung Ji-yoon said, “While we anticipate a recovery in profits from cost-cutting and base effects starting in late 2025, with company-wide operating margins around 3%, meaningful improvement in profitability will take time.”
Amid industry headwinds, William Kim appears focused on laying a foundation for profitability through cost control, aiming to capitalize on a rebound in the domestic apparel market.
At the March shareholders’ meeting, Kim stated, “To overcome the current crisis and achieve sustainable growth, we’re prioritizing a group-wide business restructuring. We are reviewing and restructuring all costs from zero base, with the goal of building a long-term, stable financial structure that enables consistent profitability.”
Reported by Heo Won-seok
-
- Lotte’s Job-based Pay Push Faces Harsh Reality — Shin Dong-bin’s Optimism Meets Tough Road Ahead
- Lotte Group Chairman Shin Dong-bin’s efforts to implement a job-based pay system aimed at improving the group’s “work culture” face numerous challenges.
Most notably, the criteria for distinguishing between “critical” and “non-critical” roles are not resonating with employees, prompting criticism that job-based pay does not suit South Korea’s organizational culture.
According to accounts from inside and outside the group on April 23, Lotte is pushing to expand job-based pay — where compensation is determined by the responsibilities of a given role — across its affiliates. However, employee dissatisfaction appears to be growing.
An employee from one affiliate said, “There were rumors about the job-based system, and it turns out they were true. Among people who joined the company at the same time, many are grumbling about the plan.”
Another employee commented, “It’s hard to understand what basis the company is using to classify jobs as important or not. Salaries at Lotte are already lower than at other conglomerates, and this is hurting morale even further.”
A job-based pay system determines salaries based on the significance and demands of the work performed, aiming to align pay more closely with actual job responsibilities.
A representative from Lotte Holdings explained, “We’re trying to build an HR system that focuses more on individual performance based on job roles, with the aim of improving efficiency and productivity.”
Currently, Lotte Department Store and Lotte Wellfood have been directed to review the introduction of job-based pay. Affiliates such as Lotte Biologics, Lotte Innovate, and Daehong Communications have already implemented it, and Lotte plans to expand the system across its affiliates.
This is the first such attempt among major South Korean conglomerates. Samsung Electronics attempted to introduce job-based pay in 2016 but abandoned the plan after strong employee backlash.
Chairman Shin appears to believe that such a drastic HR reform is necessary despite the expected pushback from employees, likely seeing limitations in the seniority-based pay system amid the group’s broader crisis.
He may view job-based compensation as essential to reforming the rigid, seniority-driven corporate culture, by aligning pay with the actual value of work performed.
Yet employees remain more wary than hopeful. A key concern is the perceived arbitrariness in defining what constitutes “important” work.
An employee at one affiliate said, “After hearing about the job-based system, people have been gathering to speculate about how their roles will be ranked, and complaints are growing. Even if jobs differ in importance, ranking departments could lead to more comparison and dissatisfaction.”
For example, in the retail sector, debates could arise about whether MDs (merchandisers) or marketing teams are more critical. Even if the company applies its own standards, it may not gain employee support.
In both academic and labor circles, the success or failure of job-based pay systems hinges on how effectively jobs are analyzed and relatively valued. Gaining consensus on which tasks are essential and which are supportive is critical.
Another employee noted, “In affiliates that lean technical, such as those with R&D roles, it’s easier to agree that research jobs should be rated highest. But in affiliates with more varied roles, like marketing or admin, grading jobs could trigger more dissatisfaction.”
To mitigate this, Lotte is reportedly considering not disclosing each employee’s job grade. In fact, affiliates that have already implemented the system do not reveal individual rankings.
Even if consensus is reached on how to grade jobs, another hurdle remains: determining compensation based on those evaluations, especially given the lack of relevant market data.
The system should be grounded in difficulty level and market competitiveness, but few South Korean firms outside the public sector have adopted it.
Critics also argue that job-based pay may not mesh well with Korea’s team-centered corporate culture, where roles are often flexible and employees are expected to help across functions when needed.
Job-based pay systems are designed for clear individual responsibilities, but Korean corporate dynamics often demand group decision-making and cross-functional support, creating a mismatch.
There are also questions about the actual effectiveness of such systems. Some financial institutions that have adopted job-based pay systems have faced criticism for being “job-based in name only.” According to a financial industry insider, the salary difference between job roles is only around 50,000 to 100,000 KRW (approx. 38 to 77 USD), which makes it difficult for employees to feel any real impact and instead breeds resentment among colleagues.
Lotte is said to be considering a pay gap of about 20% between grade 1 and grade 5 as part of its plan.
That said, the system isn’t entirely without merit. In companies where job-based pay has been implemented, roles once avoided due to high workload but low reward have attracted talent after being designated “core roles.”
Some firms allow employees in core roles to reach promotion thresholds faster, leading to greater voluntary participation and motivation.
Reported by Nam Hee-heon
-
- Samsung Electronics’ Han Jin-man Faces Dilemma Over U.S. Foundry Strategy: “Tariffs If Idle, Losses If Operated”
- Samsung Electronics is facing a dilemma over its semiconductor foundry (contract manufacturing) plant under construction in Taylor, Texas.
With no major customers secured, experts warn that launching operations as scheduled in 2026 may be akin to "pouring water into a bottomless pot."
However, not producing semiconductors in the U.S. could leave the company vulnerable to heavy tariff policies under a potential Trump administration, making it difficult to scale back the investment.
According to reports compiled from the semiconductor industry on April 23, Samsung Electronics’ foundry division may post operating losses of more than 5 trillion KRW this year. Amid these concerns, there is growing analysis that the start of operations at the Taylor foundry plant may need to be delayed.
Samsung Electronics is investing $37 billion (about 53 trillion KRW) to build two semiconductor manufacturing plants and an R&D facility in Taylor, Texas. The Taylor plant is expected to produce advanced semiconductors using 2–4nm process technology and is slated for completion in 2026.
However, it is reported that Samsung has recently delayed orders for major semiconductor equipment and is adjusting its investment pace.
This is due to difficulties in securing large clients.
Samsung is competing with Taiwan’s TSMC to secure 2nm customers, but so far has not announced any major client wins. In contrast, TSMC has reportedly secured Apple, Intel, and AMD as customers for its 2nm process.
If Samsung fails to secure enough orders, the utilization rate of the Taylor plant is expected to remain low even after completion.
Even if large orders are received, operating at a loss appears inevitable for the time being.
TSMC's plant in Arizona, completed last year and supplied with large orders from major U.S. tech companies, still recorded a net loss of 14.208 billion TWD (about 630 billion KRW) in 2024.
China’s state-run Global Times reported that “the Arizona plant imports key parts and raw materials, which increases logistics costs and lengthens supply cycles,” adding, “it’s no secret that the decision to build semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the U.S. was driven not by commercial logic, but by geopolitical pressure under the CHIPS Act.”
TSMC founder Morris Chang predicted in 2022 that "manufacturing semiconductors in the U.S. will cost 50% more than in Taiwan."
Since Samsung’s Taylor plant has not secured any large orders yet, its situation could be more serious than TSMC’s.
The financial burden on the foundry business unit is growing.
Samsung Electronics’ foundry and System LSI divisions recorded an operating loss of around 5.18 trillion KRW in 2024. This year alone, losses of over 5 trillion KRW are expected from the foundry division.
Moreover, production of the Exynos 2500 mobile application processor (AP) using 3nm process technology remains uncertain, making it even more necessary to minimize losses.
Han Jin-man, President of the Foundry Business at Samsung’s Device Solutions (DS) Division, said during a shareholders' meeting on March 19, “We will work to continuously grow sales at each process node and decisively reduce inefficient investments.”
However, simply reducing U.S. investments is also not a straightforward option.
Most of the facilities at the Taylor plant have already been built, and only some manufacturing equipment remains to be installed. Additionally, there is still a need to produce some semiconductors in the U.S. to avoid tariffs.
On April 3 (local time), former U.S. President Donald Trump stated that “tariffs will soon be imposed on semiconductors,” and in February, he mentioned tariffs at a level of 25%.
Given U.S. tariff policies and TSMC’s operations in the U.S., Samsung Electronics is essentially forced to continue investing in the U.S., despite unfavorable conditions.
An industry insider commented, “TSMC completed its U.S. plant with large orders in hand, while Samsung is nearing completion without any major contracts. While the investment decision has strong political underpinnings, with predictable losses ahead, Samsung needs to revise its plans to minimize the damage.”
Reported by Na Byung-hyun
-
- Why Cho Hyun-bum Turned to Lee Soo-il — Again, for Hanon Systems
- Lee Soo-il, Vice Chairman of Hankook & Company Group and CEO of Hanon Systems, is considered a trusted confidant of Cho Hyun-bum, Chairman and CEO of Hankook & Company Group.
Chairman Cho dispatched Vice Chairman Lee to Hanon Systems with the intention of making the company’s acquisition a crucial turning point in Hankook & Company Group’s transformation into a comprehensive mobility corporation.
This is similar to how LG Group Chairman Koo Kwang-mo appointed former LG CEO Kwon Young-soo as Vice Chairman of LG Energy Solution to strengthen its battery business.
Vice Chairman Lee is overseeing the integration process after the acquisition to ensure that Hanon Systems is stably embedded within the group, while also taking a comprehensive view of Hankook & Company Group.
◆ Background of the Acquisition by Hankook & Company
Hanon Systems is a global No. 2 in automotive thermal management systems and is experiencing a surge in demand due to the growth of eco-friendly vehicles such as electric cars.
Through its acquisition of Hanon Systems via Hankook Tire & Technology, Hankook & Company Group has completed its portfolio in tires, vehicle auxiliary batteries, and thermal management systems, further solidifying its status as a global leader.
Approximately KRW 1.44 trillion was invested in the process, giving the group a 54.77% stake.
In the automotive industry, this is interpreted as a strategy to maximize synergy effects.
Moreover, the European Union is expected to tighten its carbon neutrality-related emission regulations. This is likely to revitalize sales of eco-friendly vehicles, including electric cars, which have been facing a temporary stagnation phase (referred to as a “chasm”).
Lee Jae-il, a researcher at Eugene Investment & Securities, stated, “The EU recently announced measures to stimulate electric vehicle demand and strengthen its internal supply chain, demonstrating its commitment to overcoming the EV chasm head-on. This creates a favorable environment for Hanon Systems, now under Hankook & Company Group.”
BNK Investment & Securities researcher Lee Sang-hyun also commented, “Major European automakers like Mercedes-Benz, BMW, and Volkswagen are expected to launch new electric vehicles using newly developed electrification platforms this year, which will increase output and likely benefit Hanon Systems.”
◆ Lee Soo-il, a Traditional ‘Hankook Tire Man,’ Trusted by Cho Hyun-bum
Vice Chairman Lee joined Hankook Tire (the former name of Hankook Tire & Technology) in 1987 through open recruitment and has been a quintessential “Hankook Tire man,” spending 21 of his 37 years at the company as an executive. He has served in key roles including head of the Americas and China regional headquarters, marketing division, and operations division.
Notably, after becoming CEO and COO of Hankook Tire in 2018, he pushed for expanded sales and partnerships in the global market.
His broad industrial experience and deep understanding of overseas markets have greatly contributed to forming business strategies following the Hanon Systems acquisition.
Hankook & Company explained its decision to appoint Lee Soo-il as the new CEO of Hanon Systems by stating, “He is the right person to ensure Hanon Systems’ stable integration into the group amid an uncertain domestic and international environment, and to improve its financial structure while generating synergy. He is deemed well-suited to reinforce internal stability as the group acquires the world’s No. 2 in vehicle thermal management.”
Lee intends to create a new ecosystem that integrates tires, batteries, and thermal management systems, with a focus on synergy.
In his inauguration speech, he said, “I will do my best to improve the management efficiency of Hanon Systems and enhance its global competitiveness. Let’s grow into the world’s No. 1 HVAC system company with a proactive and challenging mindset.”
Lee has been recognized as a reliable figure for continuing to manage the company stably despite the two legal crises faced by Chairman Cho Hyun-bum.
When Chairman Cho stepped down from his CEO position in 2019 due to a personal corruption charge, Lee took over as CEO of Hankook Tire & Technology.
Even in 2023, when Chairman Cho was detained on suspicion of using tens of billions of won in company funds to renovate his house and purchase luxury vehicles, Lee continued to lead the group.
In particular, he was promoted to vice chairman after successfully overcoming the challenges caused by a fire at a Hankook Tire factory and delivering near-record-breaking performance.
◆ Can Lee Soo-il Resolve the Uncertainties at Hanon Systems?
Vice Chairman Lee is regarded as the right person to resolve potential uncertainties following the acquisition of Hanon Systems.
There are concerns that Hanon Systems’ high debt ratio might financially burden the entire Hankook & Company Group.
According to the electronic disclosure system, Hanon Systems’ debt ratio has decreased from 283% in 2022 to 268% in 2023 and 254% in 2024, but remains at a high level.
Lee is known not only as a veteran in marketing and sales but also as an expert in cost management, leading to expectations that he will be able to navigate the financial challenges effectively.
His past achievements in reducing logistics costs and operating various global business sites support this view.
Notably, during his tenure as head of the China regional office, he stabilized demand for premium tires in the Chinese market and increased the number of original equipment (OE) automotive clients from around 40 to 50—key accomplishments to his credit.
-
- Hanwha Challenges Europe's Defense Turf - Kim Dong-kwan Vows to Be a "Trusted NATO Partner"
- "The year 2024 marks the meaningful 10th anniversary of the contract signed with Poland in 2014 for the supply of K9 self-propelled howitzer chassis. As strategic partners safeguarding freedom and democracy, Korea and Poland have worked to lead international peace. We will contribute to revitalizing the economy by strengthening Poland's defense capabilities through technology transfer and localization, as well as jointly promoting exports to third countries. We will grow into a trusted partner of NATO." — At the welcome ceremony for the President of Poland held at Hanwha Aerospace's Changwon Plant 3 on October 25, 2024.
European local defense companies are building walls to protect their home turf. Can Kim Dong-kwan, Vice Chairman of Hanwha Group, establish a foothold in the European defense market?
Vice Chairman Kim expressed his determination to position Korea and Poland as trusted partners of NATO at the welcome ceremony for the Polish President held at Hanwha Aerospace’s Changwon Plant 3 on October 25, 2024.
Triggered by the Russia-Ukraine war, Korean defense companies including Hanwha Aerospace have actively expanded into Europe, but recently, local European defense companies have been increasing their checks, drawing attention.
Major European countries, considering geopolitical risks, are actively pursuing joint development and joint procurement systems to strengthen defense industry sovereignty, and are moving to institutionally restrict the market entry of Korean weapon systems.
In its annual report last year, the European Defence Agency (EDA) identified the expansion of joint procurement of European-made weapons as a key task, and formalized the policy direction to reduce dependence on weapon supplies from non-EU regions to strengthen defense capabilities.
By introducing European preference and common standards in the process of defense material procurement, attempts are being made to exclude the introduction of non-European weapon systems.
In particular, Germany and France are leading the way with an increasing number of joint development projects within Europe, such as the next-generation tank (MGCS) and fighter jet (FCAS), which is a cause for concern.
It is understood that Germany plans to establish a new agency dedicated to arms exports, the “Weapons Export Support Office,” starting in December 2024, and is preparing related systems.
The principle of European preference pursued by Germany and France is significantly affecting the defense material purchases of countries within Europe. As a result, Vice Chairman Kim Dong-kwan’s vision of a “Korean Lockheed Martin” may face setbacks.
A representative case is Croatia, which had considered adopting Hanwha Aerospace’s main defense product, the K9 self-propelled howitzer, but ultimately decided to adopt France’s Caesar howitzer and Germany’s Rheinmetall Leopard tank.
Moreover, the term of Polish President Andrzej Duda, whom Vice Chairman Kim personally welcomed last year, is set to expire in August this year, raising uncertainty for Hanwha Group.
President Duda is a member of the anti-German Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, and if the administration changes, the cooperative relationship between Hanwha Group and Poland could be shaken.
Given this series of developments, a more realistic strategy is to build defense production facilities locally in Europe or to gain recognition as a European company through joint ventures (JVs).
The establishment of a joint venture between Hanwha Aerospace and Poland’s WB is understood in the same context as a countermeasure.
However, some EU member states have systems that exclude defense companies with a high proportion of foreign investment from bidding, and there are also concerns that even if production facilities are established in Europe, high labor costs and strong labor regulations could pose challenges.
Attention is focused on whether Vice Chairman Kim Dong-kwan of Hanwha Group can successfully overcome these difficulties.
-
- KB vs. Shinhan: Yang and Jin Face Off in Round 2 of Profit Battle
- Yang Jong-hee, Chairman of KB Financial Group, and Jin Ok-dong, Chairman of Shinhan Financial Group, are expected to engage in another intense competition for leadership in the financial industry this year, following last year’s rivalry.
According to the securities industry, KB Financial is expected to outperform Shinhan in net profit not only in the soon-to-be-released Q1 results but also in full-year earnings.
However, considering Jin Ok-dong's strong focus on non-banking businesses in what is effectively the final year of his first term, the situation is not one where Chairman Yang can be entirely complacent.
On April 22, industry sources estimated that in Q1 2025, KB Financial and Shinhan Financial each recorded net profits (attributable to controlling shareholders) in the range of 1.5 trillion KRW and 1.4 trillion KRW, respectively.
If these estimates are correct, KB Financial will continue its lead over Shinhan for the first quarter, following superior performances in 2023 and 2024.
KB and Shinhan will announce their Q1 results on April 24 and 25, respectively.
Looking ahead to year-end, KB is still expected to come out on top.
The securities sector projects that KB Financial will post a full-year net profit in the mid-5 trillion KRW range, while Shinhan is forecasted to deliver results in the high-4 trillion to low-5 trillion KRW range, favoring Chairman Yang.
However, uncertainties remain.
In the past, one-off expenses due to financial incidents and gains from asset sales have frequently changed the tide in this competition.
Even the head-to-head record between KB and Shinhan over the past decade stands at 6 to 4, indicating no clear long-term dominance.
Global economic uncertainty due to the U.S.'s reciprocal tariffs is also expected to significantly influence overseas business performance.
Shinhan is aiming for 1 trillion KRW in overseas net profit this year, focusing on markets such as Vietnam, Japan, and Kazakhstan. KB is hoping to turn its Indonesian subsidiary, KB Bank, into the black.
This year being the final year of Jin Ok-dong's first term is another factor that means KB cannot rest easy.
Jin was appointed as chairman of Shinhan Financial in March 2023, with his term ending in March 2026.
Yang and Jin succeeded Yoon Jong-kyu and Cho Yong-byoung, respectively, who both fought to either defend or regain leadership positions toward the end of their tenures.
Yoon led KB from November 2014 to November 2023, and Cho led Shinhan from March 2017 to March 2023.
From 2017 to 2022, the two former chairmen competed for the top spot six times, each winning three times.
Yoon took the lead in 2017, 2020, and 2021, while Cho led in 2018, 2019, and 2022.
The term for both KB and Shinhan chairmen is three years.
Yoon successfully secured a second and third term in November 2017 and November 2020, respectively, based on his leadership achievements.
Cho also earned a second term in March 2020 following strong 2019 results, though he decided to step down at the end of 2022, citing leadership transition, even after reclaiming the top spot that year.
This year marks the second full-scale performance showdown between Yang and Jin.
Yang took office in November 2023, and Jin in March 2023. In their first full contest last year, Yang maintained the lead with KB becoming the first financial holding company in Korea to surpass 5 trillion KRW in net profit.
The competition is a matter of pride for both groups. Being the top financial holding company enhances brand value and recognition as Korea’s representative financial firm.
Jin considers strengthening non-banking businesses critical to reclaiming the top spot and is aggressively pushing investments in card, insurance, securities, and capital sectors.
Despite Shinhan Bank achieving the highest net profit among the four major banks last year, the overall holding company failed to regain the top spot due to weak non-banking performance.
Jin is actively working to address this. Last week, he made a surprise appearance at Shinhan Life’s 2025 sales event in Incheon to encourage insurance planners and rally efforts toward a brighter future.
Shareholders have also called for a focus on non-banking units.
At the March shareholders' meeting, one shareholder stated, “In the past, non-banking subsidiaries contributed over 40% of profits, playing a key role in securing leadership status. That was not the case last year.” He urged renewed performance from non-bank affiliates.
Chairman Jin responded, “Thank you for the feedback. I will reflect deeply and strive to enhance our competitiveness in the non-banking sector.”
According to analysts, Shinhan is expected to grow stably this year, supported by both banking and non-banking operations.
Kim Ji-young, head of Kyobo Securities’ research center, said in a recent report, “Despite expected interest rate cuts in 2025, Shinhan’s profitability should remain strong due to increased non-interest income, improved cost efficiency, and proactive provisioning.” She named Shinhan her top pick among bank stocks.
-
- Kurly’s Rosy Strategy with Naver—Industry Shrugs at Kim Seul-ah’s Grand Vision
- Kim Seul-ah, CEO of Kurly, has turned to an alliance with Naver as a breakthrough for the company's stagnant growth, but the e-commerce industry’s response has been lukewarm.
This is because, judging from past examples of retail companies that partnered with Naver for outward growth, meaningful results have been hard to come by.
According to conversations within the e-commerce industry on April 22, 2025, there is growing skepticism about whether the strategic collaboration between Kurly and Naver will truly benefit Kurly.
A representative case is the alliance between Shinsegae Group and Naver. In March 2021, the two companies strengthened their cooperation through a stock swap, often described as “mixing blood” rather than a simple partnership.
At that time, Emart and Shinsegae International transferred KRW 150 billion (US$ 108.2 million) and KRW 100 billion (US$ 72.1 million) worth of shares, respectively, to Naver in exchange for Naver stocks. Subsequently, Shinsegae Group’s affiliates such as SSG.com and Emart Everyday began selling their products on Naver. SSG.com joined Naver Shopping in October 2021, and Emart Everyday followed in September 2023.
However, there have been no remarkable results since then. Compared to the number of users entering through each platform’s own app, the traffic coming through Naver was not significant.
According to Emart, the transaction volume growth rate for SSG.com after joining Naver was 24% in Q4 2021, which actually decreased from the 26% growth rate in Q3.
In 2022, transaction volume grew 23% in Q1 and 13% in Q2, but fell by 5% in Q3 and plunged by 9% in Q4. This suggests that the effect of joining Naver was effectively negligible.
Homeplus also joined Naver Shopping in August 2020 in an effort to respond to the e-commerce shift but saw little effect. Homeplus had expected to gain around 1.6 million new online customers annually through the Naver Shopping platform. However, the 23rd fiscal year audit report (March 2020–February 2021), which reflects the initial impact of the partnership, showed a 4.6% drop in revenue.
Although the impact of COVID-19 was partly to blame, the fact that revenue continued to fall during the 24th fiscal year indicates that Naver failed to deliver the expected results.
One industry insider said, “It’s difficult to say that Naver users are significantly different from the customer base of other retail companies’ own apps,” and added, “While listing on Naver might provide an additional sales channel, it doesn’t necessarily translate into meaningful results.”
This is also why securities analysts remain skeptical of the partnership between the two companies.
After news of the Kurly–Naver collaboration broke, an analyst from a securities firm simply commented, “Naver is also working with Shinsegae Group, but that hasn’t been very meaningful either.”
Of course, for CEO Kim Seul-ah, cooperation with Naver likely feels urgent. Kurly’s monthly active users are reportedly stuck around the 3 million mark. Although the launch of a paid membership helped secure loyal customers, growing the user base further remains difficult.
The fact that Naver’s newly launched standalone shopping app, Naver Plus Store, surpassed 5 million downloads in just over a month would have been a very encouraging figure for Kim. It likely signaled strong potential for expanding Kurly’s customer base.
However, some believe that the differing goals between Kim and Naver may hinder the success of the partnership, as Naver’s goal in onboarding retailers isn’t to boost each individual company’s growth.
Naver has long pursued a strategy of expanding its commerce ecosystem by embracing a variety of platforms. In addition to Kurly, companies such as Shinsegae Group, Homeplus, GS The Fresh, and local markets have joined the platform. This approach is often referred to as an “anti-Coupang alliance.”
From Naver’s perspective, Kurly may end up as just one of many retailers—“one of them.”
Kim is reportedly very enthusiastic about the partnership. She is even considering transferring 10% of Kurly’s shares to Naver. Although not a formal “blood alliance” involving a stock swap, this move appears to signal intentions for a long-term relationship.
Kurly and Naver recently signed a strategic alliance to explore various ways to strengthen their e-commerce businesses based on mutual synergy.
Kurly aims to join Naver’s commerce platform, Naver Plus Store, within the year. Naver will offer users information on Kurly’s premium products, including fresh groceries.
Kim stated, “The two companies each possess a unique competitive edge that other platforms cannot easily replicate, making us ideal partners. Starting with this strategic alliance, we will deliver excellent products and services to more customers.”
#KimSeulah #Kurly #Naver #ecommerce #NaverPlusStore #partnership #WemakeKurly #retailstrategy #KoreanRetail #commerceAlliance
